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The creep of surveillance 
• Arbitrary surveillance is spreading, but this seems to make it 
less noticeable 
• One particularly strong rhetorical defence of surveillance: 
 
What do people want to hide? 
• Not just illegal activity 
• Stigmatised identities 
• Protect ourselves from unjust interference by 
illegitimate authorities 
• Moreover, surveillance tech is flawed   
 
 
Privacy – too broad and too narrow 
• While there are many things we legitimately want to 
hide, privacy is not just about hiding 
–Privacy as “selective control…” (Altman, 1974) 
–  “….over who has access to the self or to one’s 
group”  
• But this makes privacy very broad and nebulous 
• Yet some researchers argue that ‘privacy’ is too 
narrow to capture the damage surveillance causes 
(Bennett & Parsons, 2013) 
Research questions 
• Under what conditions do people find blanket 
or arbitrary surveillance (un)acceptable? 
• Are feelings of threat under surveillance due 
to: 
– personal privacy threat,  
– social identity threat,  
– and/or perceptions of unfairness, discrimination 
• Moving privacy beyond a ‘individualised’ 
concern 
Surveillance and social identity 
• O’Donnell (2010a,2010b) 
– Imposing surveillance undermines shared identity between 
leaders and followers in organizational settings 
– Identification with one’s city means CCTV surveillance is seen as 
more acceptable, if the purpose is to ensure safety 
 
• Our research adopts a similar approach, and examines further 
whether people are concerned about the privacy of their 
group and/or their social identity reputation 
• And in the second study considers fairness as well 
Study 1 
• Online survey with 83 undergraduate 
students at the University of Exeter  
• Proposed different rationales for why the 
University is considering switching on the 
location-tracking feature of the iExeter app 
• 2x2 design:  
– Reason for surveillance 
• Social identity threat: University is concerned 
about lad culture and poor attendance 
• Benefit trade-off: University is concerned about 
managing space on campus for student society use 
– Sports/non-sports society membership 
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• Identity threat,  e.g. “The use of the location tracking app is threatening to 
societies” 
• Privacy threat, e.g. “The location tracking app is a breach of my privacy” 
• Correlated r = .5 
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Discussion 
• The threat and trade-off scenarios seem to have some 
relevance in shifting attitudes towards surveillance 
– The proposal is generally opposed, but there is decreased 
opposition by sports-societies for improved facilities 
– Identity threatening for sports societies when framed as 
cracking down on lad culture – “hit you where it hurts” 
• Limitations: 
– Are these results are specific to this university? 
– Small sample 
– Link between privacy and identity threat is not entirely clear  
• Decided to try and distinguish between ‘collective privacy’ and 
identity threat 
– Third ‘pathway’ – perceptions of fairness 
Study 2 
• 291 students from across 85 universities in the 
UK (recruited via Prolific), ~51% female 
• All members of at least one student society 
• Experimental manipulations the same, except 
wording changed to “Universities around the 
UK are considering switching on location-
tracking capabilities…” 
Measures 
• Privacy invasion (adapted from Alge, 2001), α = .86 
• Fairness: “I think the location monitoring used by my 
university would be fair” (Alder & Ambrose, 2005) 
• Group threat/collective privacy (adapted from individual 
privacy measures), e.g. “Students in my society do not need to 
be monitored.” 
– Also items about reputation/recognition 
– “This location tracking would have a negative effect on the 
reputation of my student society” 
– “This location tracking would ensure the needs of my society 
were properly recognized” 
Combined α = .6  
Results 
• No significant difference across conditions  
• Regression on behavioural intentions:   
F(3,289)=145.37, p < .001.  R2 = .61 
 
 
 
 
 
    **all significant at p < .001 
 
• Individual privacy correlates with collective privacy r = .36, 
and with fairness r = -.65  
 
  Beta T 
Collective privacy .228 5.67 
Individual privacy .513 10.28 
Fairness -.202 4.07 
Discussion 
• The scenarios aren’t generalizable across the 
UK 
• But collective privacy and individual privacy 
appear to be distinguishable 
• Measures still need some refinement 
• How does fairness relate to privacy? 
 
General Discussion 
• The self relevance of surveillance may also be 
a tool for increasing awareness, 
– If you can find scenarios that are relevant to the group 
• When does concern turn into action? 
– Surveillance resistance is hard to connect to a political 
collective identity 
 
The end (but not of privacy) 
Please contact us if you have further questions or 
suggestions: 
a.stuart@exeter.ac.uk,  m.levine@exeter.ac.uk  
@AvelieS   @ProfMarkLevine 
 
 
Acknowledgements: Thanks to Jade Butler for her contribution to study 1, 
and to the Social, Environmental and Organisational Research Group at Exeter 
for their helpful feedback 
